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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue 1
Saddam Hussein has been charged with murder and crimes against humanity for crimes
he committed against the people of Al-Dujail in response to an assassination attempt against him
in 1982.

Saddam escaped unharmed, but unleashed his vengeance on Al-Dujail.

individuals were summarily executed immediately following the incident.

Several

Fifteen hundred

others were subsequently arrested and taken to prison, where many were tortured and remained
for four years. Approximately 143 of those arrested were executed in show trials. Saddam also
ordered the destruction of the town’s main source of income, the palm groves and orchards.
Saddam Hussein is likely to argue that his actions against the citizens of Al-Dujail are no
different than those taken by the United States in Afghanistan after 9/11. He believes that the
people of Al-Dujail are terrorists and that he was merely protecting the country against an
insurgency. In this view, his actions were nothing more than self-defense and were necessary to
prevent destabilization of the Iraqi government. This memorandum will address the historical
use of self-defense as justification for retaliation against terrorists, its effectiveness, and whether
it is a legitimate defense to the heinous crimes committed in Al-Dujail by the former dictator.

1

Issue as presented: Saddam Hussein has been charged with destroying the town of Al-Dujail in response to an
assassination attempt against him. The defense is likely to equate Hussein’s actions to those of the United States in
Afghanistan in response to the attacks of 9/11, and to those of the United States and Iraqi forces in Iraq in response
to the current insurgency. This is similar to the strategy Slobodan Milosevic has employed before the ICTY with
respect to charges that he ordered the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo, who he claimed were
terrorists. Provide an analysis of the legitimacy of this defense strategy.

1

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The “Self-Defense” Defense is a Valid Defense Recognized by the International
Community.
Self-defense is recognized by the international community as an “inherent right” and is a
valid justification for an armed response against an aggressor. The right has been recognized in
modern customary international law since 1837 when the defense was argued by Great Britain
after its troops attacked an American steamship suspected of harboring and assisting Canadian
insurgents (hereinafter, the “Caroline incident”). 2

The United Nations also recognizes this

“inherent” and long-established right under customary international law in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, if “an armed attack has occurred.” 3 The International Criminal Court 4 has even codified
the validity of the defense in its statutes. Self-defense is a valid and recognized defense under
international law and Saddam Hussein should be allowed to argue the defense in response to the
charges that have been brought against him.

2. International Law Supports The Use of Self-Defense against Non-State Actors.
International law does not restrict the application of self-defense only to conflicts that
arise between two separate nations or states. A state or government may also defend itself
against an “armed attack” by insurgents or terrorists that are non-state actors. The first example
in recent history of a government attacking a non-state actor was seen in the Caroline incident
where the British attacked an American ship that had been assisting Canadian insurgents who
2

For a full accounting of the Caroline incident, see 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, §
217, 409-414 (1906) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
3

U.N. Charter, Art. 51 (1945) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

4

Self-defense is allowed for defendants appearing before the International Criminal Court, see Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF, 183/9, art. 31(1)(c) (1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 5].

2

opposed the crown. 5 Since that time, it has generally been seen as acceptable for a nation to
defend itself against a non-state actor so long as the appropriate steps have been taken.
The U.N. Charter does not prevent a nation from engaging in self-defense against a nonstate actor. Though the U.N. Charter was created to prevent war and armed conflict between
nations, nothing in the Charter precludes its application to armed conflicts between a state and
citizens of that state. Article 51 provides for individual self-defense when an armed attack has
occurred. The same Article, however, is silent on the source of the armed attack. The fact that
Article 51 has made no modifications to previous international law on the subject supports the
proposition that a state may respond to attacks from wherever they may originate. Saddam
Hussein was not prohibited from defending himself or his government from an armed attack by
insurgents that were non-state actors.

3.

The Assassination Attempt by the Alleged Terrorists in Al-Dujail May Not be
Considered an “Armed Attack” as Required under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Any armed response taken by a state in reaction to hostile action by a third party will be

deemed illegal if the third party action does not rise to the level of an “armed attack” under
customary international law. Not all attacks on a state or nation rise to the level of “armed
attack” as required by the U.N. Charter. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in Nicaragua
v. U.S. stated that it is necessary to distinguish “the gravest forms of the use of force (those
constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.” 6 Governments and experts disagree
as to what forms of hostile action will rise to the threshold of intensity that justifies a nation’s use

5

Moore, supra note 2, at 409-414 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

6

Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101, para. 191, (I.C.J. 1986) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
20].

3

of self-defense.

Though the international community has infrequently validated a nation’s

exercise of self-defense, it is generally agreed that the attacks of 9/11 are considered an “armed
attack.” The attack on Saddam Hussein, in contrast, probably does not rise to the required level
of intensity to be deemed an “armed attack.”
The ICJ provided some additional insight on the issue in Nicaragua where it held that an
“armed attack” occurs when a regular armed force crosses an international border, or when a
state sends an armed band to carry out acts of armed force against another state.7 These actions
must amount to an actual attack by regular forces. Those responsible for the assassination
attempt against Saddam Hussein could hardly be considered a regular force in the traditional
sense, since they more closely resembled a makeshift group of thugs or gangsters with assault
rifles. The attack on Saddam Hussein would therefore probably not be considered an “armed
attack” under international law.
Even if the assassination attempt were deemed to be an “armed attack” under
international law, Saddam Hussein has not provided conclusive evidence linking the citizens of
Al-Dujail to the attack, and providing assistance to those responsible for the attack would not rise
to the level of attack justifying the counter-defense undertaken by Saddam Hussein. The ICJ has
refused to validate a state’s exercise of self-defense without first proving that the party against
whom the counter-attack is launched is to blame for the original “armed attack.” 8 Saddam
Hussein has provided no evidence linking the attack to the citizens he retaliated against. Even if
the townspeople provided support to Saddam’s attackers, the ICJ in Nicaragua held that
providing weapons or logistical support to rebels or insurgents does not amount to an armed
7

Id. at 103, quoting from the U.N Definition of Aggression.

8

Iran v. U.S., 2003 WL 23335678, p. 21, para. 51 (I.C.J. 2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
19].

4

attack by regular forces. 9 Any logistical support, shelter, food, or even weapons that the citizens
of Al-Dujail may have provided to the alleged terrorists are equivalent to criminal acts at best
and do not rise to the level of an armed attack that justifies defensive actions under international
law. Saddam Hussein’s actions against the people of Al-Dujail were unlawful because any
support they may have provided to the alleged insurgents is not considered an armed attack
under international law.

4. Saddam Hussein’s Actions Against the Town of Al-Dujail Will Probably Not
Satisfy the Customary International Law Requirement of Necessity and
Proportionality.
To avoid violation of customary international law, Saddam Hussein’s counter-measures
against the town of Al-Dujail must be deemed necessary, instant, and overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 10 Though an “armed attack” creates a strong
presumption of necessity, there must exist no other practical alternative to a counter-force. In
addition to the customary international law precedent, these principles are also embodied in the
U.N. Charter which requires a country to explore peaceful resolutions to a threat before relying
on the use of military force. Just as the U.S. would not negotiate with terrorists, it is also
unreasonable to require Saddam Hussein to negotiate, reason, or seek other peaceful resolutions
with his attackers. However, the annihilation of an entire town, in these circumstances, does not
approach the prerequisite of “necessity” under international law. The actions undertaken by the
alleged terrorists “necessitated” a response by the Iraqi government appropriate for dealing with
criminals, such as arresting those responsible and holding a fair and unbiased trial.

9

Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 102-105 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

10

Moore, supra note 2, at 409-414 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

5

The

argument that the large counter-assault and massacre at Al-Dujail was a necessary response does
not muster credibility.
Under customary international law, any defensive measures undertaken by the harmed
nation must be proportionate to the seriousness and scope of the initial armed attack. 11
Admittedly, it is difficult to dispute that an assassination attempt against a president of a nation is
not serious. A state’s use of force, however, must be proportional to the scope of the original
armed attack that occurred. The would-be assassins who attacked Saddam Hussein and his
convoy only killed a few of Saddam’s bodyguards and damaged government property. 12
Whereas those responsible should indeed have been arrested and imprisoned, Saddam went far
beyond what is acceptable under international standards.

In retaliation for the attempted

assassination, Saddam Hussein summarily executed several men, arrested and tortured hundreds
of Al-Dujail’s citizens, executed 143 young men in show trials, 13 razed 250,000 acres of palm
groves, 14 and destroyed the homes of those held responsible. The seriousness of the attempted
assassination of Saddam Hussein cannot justify his disproportionate response which resulted in
the obliteration of a whole community.

11

2 RUDIGER WOLFRUM, CHRISTIANE PHILLIP, UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, 49-50 (1995)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
12

AP, Survivors tell story of early attempt on Saddam’s life__and the punishment it brought, at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/05/27/international0134EDT0414.DTL [hereinafter
Survivors]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52].

13

Id. Some of the evidence uncovered just days after the fall of Saddam’s regime was recovered in the ransacked
intelligence headquarters in the capital.

14

John F. Burns, The Struggle for IRAQ: THE RECKONING; A Town That Bled Under Hussein Hails His Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at Section: 1. 2005 WLNR 10446389 (2005) [hereinafter The Reckoning] [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 56].

6

5. Armed Reprisal or Acts of Revenge are Prohibited Against Civilians Under
International Law.
While self-defense is recognized in customary international law as a lawful justification
for the use of force, Saddam Hussein’s retaliatory acts against the town of Al-Dujail and its
citizens will probably be deemed a reprisal or act of revenge. Reprisals against civilians and
civilian targets are especially egregious and constitute a grave breach of international
humanitarian law. 15 A clearly excessive amount of counterforce can be interpreted as a blatant
reprisal disguised as self-defense. 16 Saddam’s attack on the village of Al-Dujail was a reprisal or
act of vengeance. Rather than simply arrest the perpetrators, Saddam decided to punish the
citizens of Al-Dujail by razing the palm groves and destroying many homes and businesses.
Many villagers were also transported to Saddam’s gulags and beaten or tortured. Saddam’s
actions were clearly meant to be punishment for the attempted assassination. Simply claiming
that a retaliatory act is an act of self-defense may be insufficient to disguise what was really an
unlawful reprisal.

6. The Inability to Distinguish Terrorists or Insurgents from Innocent Civilians is
Not Sufficient to Justify Murder or Crimes Against Humanity as An Act of SelfDefense.
The inability to distinguish terrorists or insurgents from innocent civilians is not a valid
argument justifying murder or crimes against humanity under customary international law.
Under Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, parties to an armed conflict are required to
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and may direct their operations only

15

GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 6th COmm., 25th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/8082 [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].
16

Wolfrum, supra note 11, at 1168 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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against military objectives. 17

Whenever it is uncertain whether a person is a civilian or a

combatant, that person is considered to be a civilian under international law. 18 Notwithstanding
that Saddam was unable to distinguish the Dawa terrorists from civilians, it was unlawful to
launch an attack against the citizens of Al-Dujail because of their civilian status. It is also
contrary to the laws of war to kill civilians unless they are armed and jeopardizing the safety of
troops. 19 No evidence indicates that those who were summarily executed were armed or resisted
in any manner which would justify Saddam’s acts as a lawful exercise of self-defense. It was
unlawful and murderous for Saddam Hussein to kill or harm civilians unless they were armed
and jeopardizing the safety of his troops. The inability to distinguish terrorists or insurgents
from innocent civilians is not a valid justification under international law for the summary
executions and other atrocities that occurred in Al-Dujail.

7. Saddam Hussein Will Not Successfully Avoid Liability for His Crimes Under Tu
Quoque Defense.
Saddam Hussein’s likely argument that the atrocities that he committed in Al-Dujail are
defensible because the United States has committed similar acts while combating terrorists in
Iraq and Afghanistan will not be successful. Even if the assumption holds true that the U.S. has
committed similar atrocities in its efforts to eliminate terrorists, the international courts have
universally rejected the tu quoque defense, which literally means, “you too.” In Hadzihasanovic,

17

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 49, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4, 16 I.L.M.
1391 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
18

Id. at art. 50(1).

19

General William C. Westmoreland testified that “there is no justification for eliminating civilians unless they are
armed and jeopardizing the safety of U.S. troops where a matter of self-defense comes into play,” see U.S. v. Calley,
46 C.M.R. 1131, 1160 (U.S. Army Ct. Mil. Rev. 1973) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter, the “ICTY”) stated
that “the Tribunal's jurisprudence is quite clear that the principles of tu quoque [do] not
constitute a defense and has no basis in the law.”20 In Kupreskic, the ICTY again held that the tu
quoque defense has no place in contemporary international humanitarian law.

21

An accused

does not exculpate himself from a crime by showing that another has committed a similar crime,
either before or after the commission of the crime by the accused. 22 The accepted international
belief is that every individual has the duty and obligation to adhere to international law
regardless of the conduct of enemy combatants. Thus, it is irrelevant whether the United States
has engaged in unlawful or criminal acts while fighting terrorists. Saddam’s tu quoque defense
will not pass judicial muster and he will be held accountable for any criminal actions that he has
committed.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Investigation Concluded Regarding Massacre of Al-Dujail.
On February 26, 2005, the Iraqi Special Tribunal (hereinafter “IST”), 23 also known as the
Iraqi High Criminal Court, announced that the Court of Investigations at the IST had concluded

20

Hadzihasanovic et al., Transcript (IT-01-47), (Nov. 28, 2003); 2003 WL 23697684 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

21

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judicial Supplement 2, 12043 (ICTY Trial Chamber, February 17,
1999) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

22

Id.

23

The IST is independent of any Iraqi government bodies and has jurisdiction over specified crimes committed by
any Iraqi nationals or residents between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003, the period of the Baath party rule, see
United States Institute of Peace, Building the Iraqi Special Tribunal: Lessons from Experiences in International
Criminal Justice, Special Report 122, (June 2004) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
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the investigation pertaining to the crimes committed in the village of Al-Dujail 24 in 1982. 25 The
investigation was performed in accordance with Article (12) of the IST Law No. (1)/2003. 26
Saddam Hussein, as well as seven 27 others will be tried for murder, crimes against humanity and
various other crimes identified in that investigation.

The initial trial is expected to begin

sometime in October 2005 and will address only the crimes committed in Al-Dujail. Saddam
Hussein will be tried first on the crimes committed in the town of Al-Dujail because it is the
easiest case on which to gather evidence and provides the best chance for a speedy conviction.
The prosecution also believes that separating the multiplicity of atrocities committed by Saddam
Hussein over the course of his presidency into discrete events will help eliminate frivolous
nonsubstantive arguments that will likely arise early in the trials. 28

24

Al-Dujail is a small town in Iraq, of approximately 10,000 inhabitants, 60 kilometers north of Baghdad, at
Wikipedia, Dujail, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dujail [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 72].
25

Iraq Special Tribunal, Investigation into Al-Dujail Crimes Concludes, at
http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/press/releases/0014a.htm [hereinafter Investigation] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 59].
26

The IST has subject matter jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, see
Laws of Iraqi Special Tribunal, PART TWO: Crimes Against Humanity, Article 12, at
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/content.asp?id=2 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
27

Other high-value detainees that will also be tried in the Al-Dujail crimes are: Barzan Ebraheem Hassan Al-Tikriti,
the half-brother of Saddam Hussein and former chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service; Taha Yasin Ramadan, former
deputy prime minister and Vice President; Awad Hamad Al-Bander, former chief judge of the Revolutionary Court;
Abdullah Kadhem Ruaid and his son Mizher Abdulah Rowed Al-Musheikhi, two local Ba’athist officials in AlDujail; Ali Daeem Ali; and Mohammed Azawi Ali. See Iraq Special Tribunal Website, Sharing of Evidence and
Notification of Trial Date, at http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/press/releases/0024e.htm [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 60].
28

Khalil al-Duleimi, Saddam’s defense counsel, has already made it clear that he intends to discredit the tribunal
and argue against its validity, see IRIN News.ORG, IRAQ: Focus on forthcoming trial of Saddam Hussein, at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47858&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=IRAQ
[hereinafter Forthcoming Trial] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 61].
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B. Historical Accounting of Assassination Attempt and Destruction of Al-Dujail.
In 1982, Iraq was at war with its Shiite neighbor, Iran.29 Many citizens of Al-Dujail were
also Shiites and despised Saddam for starting the war two years prior. 30

Though Saddam

Hussein distrusted the predominantly Shiite town, he planned a trip to Al-Dujail to build support
for the war. 31 Dawa, 32 a conservative Shiite religious party with strong support in Al-Dujail, had
an armed wing that had previously mounted terrorist attacks against Saddam Hussein’s
government. 33 Dawa saw Saddam’s visit as a chance to avenge the government’s killings of
hundreds of Dawa leaders and sympathizers. 34
On July 8, 1982, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Saddam Hussein’s convoy drove into the
town of Al-Dujail. As he passed the palm groves that aligned each side of the highway,
seventeen gunmen with Kalashnikov rifles fired on Saddam Hussein and his procession. 35
Though several of Saddam’s body guards were claimed to have been killed in the attack,36

29

The Reckoning, supra note 14 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56].

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Also called the Islamic Dawa Party or Al-Dawa. The Dawa party was formed in the late 1950s by a group of
Shiite leaders and created to combat atheistic communism and Baathist Arab socialism which were then ascendant
in Iraq. Dawa rose to prominence in the 1970’s when it waged an armed campaign against the Iraqi government. It
supported the Islamic Revolution in Iran and received support from Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. In 1979 Dawa
created a military wing. Dawa committed several assassination attempts against Iraqi leaders, including Saddam
Hussein, Tariq Aziz and Saddam’s son, Uday. Wikipedia, Islamic Dawa Party, at
http://en.wikipediaorg/wiki/Islamic_Dawa_Party [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 74].
33

The Reckoning, supra note 14 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56].

34

Id.

35

Survivors, supra note 12 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52].

36

Id.
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Saddam’s car was bullet proof and he escaped by helicopter unharmed. 37 Eyewitnesses reported
that several of the townspeople who came to see the ensuing events were killed when Saddam’s
forces fired upon the crowd. Within days, several state security forces of Saddam’s regime
composed of units from the Iraqi army, agents of the Iraqi Intelligence Service and other police
agencies descended on Al-Dujail. 38
Saddam accused the people of Al-Dujail of being conspirators in an attempt to kidnap
and kill him 39 and retaliated directly against the people of Al-Dujail. As many as fifteen
individuals were summarily executed shortly after the assassination attempt. 40 Approximately
1,500 men, women and children were wrongly arrested. 41 Those arrested were sent to Saddam
Hussein’s gulags, first to a detention center in Tikrit, later to a secret police detention center in
Baghdad, and finally, to the Nugra as-Salman prison, an old British-built fort in the desert along
the Saudi Arabian border. 42 Many of these individuals were never charged or brought to trial.43
A total of 375 women, children, teenagers and old men were incarcerated for four years. 44 Many
of these individuals were tortured, including several of the younger women whose torture was

37

John F. Burns, Iraqi Tribunal Details Plan to Prosecute Saddam Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005 [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 55].

38

Investigation, supra note 25 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59].
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IRIN News.ORG, IRAQ: Focus on forthcoming trial of Saddam Hussein, at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47858&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=IRAQ
[hereinafter Trial] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 61].

40

Edward Wong, Charges Presented Against 5 Former Allies of Saddam Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2005, at
Section: A, 2005 WLNR 3081387 (2005) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 75].
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The Reckoning, supra note 14 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56].
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Wong, supra note 40 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 75].
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Survivors, supra note 12 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52].
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aimed at forcing them to confess that brothers or fathers were members of Dawa. 45 Mr. Sadoon,
the chief of the revolutionary court, ordered approximately 143 men, some as young as 13, to be
executed during show trials at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad. Some of the evidence
recovered indicates that Saddam Hussein not only knew of and approved of these death
sentences, but issued a presidential decree ordering the execution by hanging of these Dujail
men. 46
Saddam Hussein also destroyed the economic livelihood of the town of Al-Dujail.
Within weeks of the attempted assassination, Saddam had more than 250,000 acres of AlDujail’s palm groves and orchards bulldozed. 47 These orchards represented the town’s primary
source of income. 48 Saddam also salted the groves to assure that the townspeople would never
harvest fruit or crops from the land again. 49

Scores of homes and buildings were also

demolished. 50

45

Id.

46

Survivors, supra note 12 (Some of the evidence uncovered just days after the fall of Saddam’s regime was
recovered in the ransacked intelligence headquarters in the capital) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 52].
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The Reckoning, supra note 14 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56].
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Survivors, supra note 12 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52].

49

Michael P. Scharf. Fox News special: Big Story Weekend, Saddam Hussein On Trial, Oct. 1, 2005 [Reproduced in
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John F. Burns, The Struggle for IRAQ: Tribunal; First Case Against Hussein, Involving Killings in 1982, Is Sent
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C. Saddam Hussein will Likely Argue that Crimes Committed in Al-Dujail Were
Justified as Acts of Self-Defense.
Saddam is likely to claim that any atrocities committed against the town of Al-Dujail and
its citizens were lawfully justified as acts of self-defense. This justification is based on two
primary theories. First, Saddam Hussein is expected to argue that his actions against the citizens
of Al-Dujail are no different from those taken by the United States in Afghanistan after 9/11 in
response to the bombing of the World Trade Center towers. Similarly, Saddam Hussein would
argue that he was the victim of a terrorist attack and was therefore justified in his actions. AlDulaimi, Saddam’s head lawyer, has stated that “punishing those who carried out the
assassination attempt is justifiable all over the world and any president in the position of Saddam
would do the same thing.” 51 Second, Saddam Hussein is likely to argue that the armed attacks
against the citizens of Al-Dujail are no different from the bombings and raids the American
military is currently undertaking against insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. Saddam Hussein
believes that the people of Al-Dujail were terrorists and insurgents52 and any assaults on the
citizens of Al-Dujail were preemptive measures necessary to protect the country from an
insurgency. In this view, his actions were nothing more than self-defense and necessary to
prevent destabilization of the Iraqi government. 53

51

Mona Mahmoud, Steven Komarow, USA Today, Oct. 13, 2005, 2005 WLNR 16584572 (2005) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
52

Forthcoming Trial, supra note 28 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 61].
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III. HISTORICAL USE OF SELF-DEFENSE AS JUSTIFICATION FOR USING
ARMED FORCE AGAINST TERRORISTS OR STATES THAT SUPPORT AND
HARBOR TERRORISTS.

A. U.S. Justified Bombing of Libya in 1986 as Lawful Exercise of Self-Defense Because
Libya Sponsored Terrorist Attacks on the United States.
On April 15, 1986, the United States conducted a series of air strikes against Libya in
response to the terrorist bombing of a discotheque in West Germany where one American was
killed and several others were injured. The United States conducted these attacks against what
the White House called “terrorist centers” and military bases in Libya. 54 According to a Senior
Libyan official, thirty-seven people were killed and another ninety-three were injured by the
American attack. 55
Following the air strikes against Libya, the United States asserted that the aerial assault
was justified on grounds of self-defense and was necessary given the terrorist actions committed
by the Libyan government against the United States. President Reagan stated that the attack was
retaliation for Libya’s direct role in the bombing of the West Berlin discotheque and for its
“reign of terror”56 against the United States and its citizens. The United States viewed its actions
as necessary and proportionate 57 to the sustained, clear and widespread use of terror against
Americans by the Libyan government.

The preemptive actions against Libya’s terrorist

installations were intended to diminish Colonel Qaddafi’s capacity to export terror and deter him
54

Bernard Weinraub, U.S. Jets Hit “Terrorist Centers” in Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at Section: A, 1986
WLNR 827539 (1986) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 71].

55

Edward Schumacher, Tension Over Libya: A Day of Bitterness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1986, at Section: 1, 1986,
WLNR 809624 (1986) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 68].
56

Weinraub, supra note 54 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 71].

57

U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2674th mtg. at 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2674 (1986), (The U.S. had convincing evidence
that Libya was not only responsible for the East Berlin bombing but was also engaged in the planning of a multitude
of future attacks against the United States) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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from further attacks against the United States. Reports demonstrated that Libya supported over
one dozen camps where about 1,000 persons were trained in guerilla warfare, explosives, and
arms for use in sabotage operations. 58 Libya was known as a safe haven for terrorists and
provided substantial financial resources to various terrorist organizations.
Though the United States believed its attack on Libya was justified as a valid exercise of
self-defense under international law, the international community did not share its views. Many
U.N. delegates argued that the U.S. raid was not justified as an act of self-defense because there
was no antecedent aggression by Libya within the meaning of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 59
Many states also claimed that U.S. charges of Libyan involvement in terrorism were
unsubstantiated. 60 For these states the claim of terrorist involvement was too attenuated and
more conclusive proof was needed to justify the attack on Libya.
A few nations 61 publicly stated their disapproval of the United States’ actions and the
Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad, and the United Arab Emirates even sponsored a resolution
before the United Nations Security Council to condemn the bombings by the United States as

58

Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 177 (Spring 1987), citing The Libyan Problem, U.S. Dept of State Bureau of Pub. Affairs, Spec. Rep. No. 111, at
1, (Oct. 1983) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
59

Algeria denied any validation of self-defense under Charter unless there has been an act of aggression and in this
case Algeria did not believe that such an act had been undertaken by Libya, see U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2676th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV .2676 (1986). Ghana even described the U.S. bombing as a reprisal and argued that it was
doubtful that an armed attack within the meaning of the U.N. Charter had occurred, as such attacks are more typical
of an armed invasion perpetrated against the territorial integrity or sovereign independence of the United States, see
U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2675th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2675 (1986) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tabs 12 and 11].
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U.N. Doc. S/PV .2675 (remarks by Ambassador Al-Ansi (Oman)); see also U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2680th mtg.,
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being in violation of the U.N. Charter. 62 Bulgaria, China, the Soviet Union, and Thailand also
voted in favor of that proposed resolution. Though the resolution before the U.N. Security
Council was ultimately vetoed by the United States, Great Britain and France, the U.N. General
Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution condemning the United States for the attack against
Libya as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law. 63

B. U.S. Argued Self-Defense as Justification for Launching Cruise Missiles into Iraq in
1993 After Assassination Attempt on Former President Bush.
On June 26, 1993, the United States launched twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles at
the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Baghdad causing a number of civilian deaths 64 and destroying
much of the complex. The United States justified the attack on Iraq as a valid use of self-defense
for the foiled assassination attempt against former President Bush two months prior. On April
14, 1993, while President Bush was beginning a three-day visit to Kuwait city, Kuwaiti
authorities thwarted a terrorist plot, seizing a powerful car bomb and other explosives and
arresting 16 suspects. 65 The ringleaders were two Iraqi nationals.

After careful investigation,

the United States provided conclusive proof that the attempted assassination was the work of the

62

Intoccia, supra note 58, at 189 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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U.N. A/RES/41/38 (1986). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
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Raid on Baghdad: Iraq Reports Many Killed, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, at Sect. 1, 1993 WLNR 3397390
(1993). [hereinafter Raid]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 65].
65

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3245th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 (1993). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14].
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Iraqi Intelligence Service acting under the direction of the Iraqi government and not a small
group of people acting independently. 66
The United States declared that its actions were justified as an act of self-defense and
were carefully implemented to be proportional to the attempted assassination on President Bush.
On June 27, 1993, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright appeared before
the Security Council and stated that it was America’s view that an assassination attempt against
its former Head of State is an attack against itself. The United States was therefore entitled to
directly respond to such a threat under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides
for the exercise of self-defense in such cases. 67 Recognizing that the element of proportionality
is required for a valid self-defense claim under international law, the United States carefully
provided justifications for the target chosen (the Iraqi Intelligence Service). Secretary of State
Les Aspin in a Pentagon briefing stated that “the Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters was
selected because it is the closest thing related to the provocation. They were the ones responsible
for planning the attempt on President Bush’s life, and so we wanted to make sure we had a target
that was the nexus to the provocation.” 68 The United States also sought to debilitate Iraq from
engaging in future acts of terrorism.

The attack was designed to damage the terrorist

infrastructure of the Iraqi regime, reduce its ability to promote terrorism and deter further acts of
aggression against the United States. 69

66

Raid on Baghdad; Pentagon Statements on the Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, at Sect. 1, 1993 WLNR
3397382 (1993) [hereinafter Pentagon Statements] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 64].
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U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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Pentagon Statements, supra note 66 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 65].
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U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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Unlike the predominately negative reaction by the international community in response to
the American bombing of Libya in 1986, most states either supported or did not object to the
cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

Following Madeleine Albright’s

presentation before the Security Council, representatives of other member states either
manifested their support for the U.S. action or refrained from voicing any criticism. Several
nations stated that the U.S. was justified in its actions and made reference to the missile attack as
being proportional to the Iraqi Intelligence’s actions. 70 China was the only nation that made any
statements that can be construed negatively by indicating that it “would not endorse any action
that might intensify the tension in the region.” 71 No action was subsequently taken by the U.N.
Security Council as a result of the U.S. missile attack.

C. U.S. Justified Invasion of Afghanistan as Act of Self-Defense in Response to Terrorist
Attacks of 9/11.
On September 11, 2001, the United States was the victim of a brutal terrorist attack that
rocked the international community. Terrorists hijacked two airplanes and flew them into the
World Trade Center towers in New York City, another airplane slammed into the Pentagon, and
a final terrorist plot was thwarted by the passengers of United Airlines flight 93 which later
crashed into the countryside of Pennsylvania. The terrorist attacks resulted in the deaths of
almost 3,000 persons, including nationals of 81 countries, as well as the destruction of four

70

Id. (France placed a great deal of importance on the response being proportionate to the action of the Iraqi secret
service and the reasons the missile attack was carried out; Japan considered the situation to be unavoidable; Hungary
stated that U.S. action was justified; the United Kingdom believed the action was justified, proper and proportionate;
the Russian Federation viewed the actions by the United States as justified and arising from states right of selfdefense under U.N. Charter; and Spain viewed an assassination attempt by a nation’s secret service to be very
serious).
71

Id.
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civilian aircraft, the World Trade Center towers and a section of the Pentagon. 72 An attack on
American soil of this magnitude had not been seen since the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1942.

Congress subsequently granted authority to President Bush to use all

necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001. 73
On October 7, 2001, the United States notified the U.N. Security Council that it was
exercising its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense permitted by Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter and that its armed forces had initiated actions designed to prevent and deter
further attacks on the U.S. 74 The United States declared that the attack and the ongoing threat to
the United States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization were made possible by
the decision of the Taliban regime to allow parts of Afghanistan to be used as a terrorist base of
operation. 75 On October 8, 2001, the United States, Great Britain and other U.S. allies launched
a powerful barrage of cruise missiles and long-range bombers against Afghanistan in a campaign
to destroy the terrorist training camps of Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and overthrow
the Taliban government. 76 President Bush announced that the carefully targeted actions were
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U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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PL 107-40, September 18, 2001, 115 Stat 224 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
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Patrick E. Tyler, A Nation Challenged: The Attack; U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2001, 2001 WLNR 3365194 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70].
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designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the
military capability of bin Laden’s organization. 77
The United States’ use of force against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban received unprecedented
international support and approval. The U.N. Security Council unequivocally condemned the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and declared the acts a threat to international peace and security. The
Security Council further recognized the United States’ inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense in accordance with the Charter. 78

The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,

Germany and France all pledged forces for the operation and more than 40 countries in the
Middle East, Africa, Europe and across Asia granted air transit and landing rights. 79

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Introduction and Roadmap for Legal Analysis Section.
Self-defense is universally recognized and accepted by the international community as an
“inherent right” and valid justification for an armed response against an aggressor. The right of
self-defense is found in the Caroline Doctrine, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Self-defense is a valid and recognized defense under
customary international law, and subsection B will show that Saddam Hussein should be allowed
to argue the defense in response to the charges that have been brought against him. Subsection C
will make clear why self-defense is applicable to attacks by terrorists or non-state actors.

77

Id.
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U.N. 4370th mtg., S/RES/1368 (2001) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15] See also U.N.
4385th mtg. S/RES/1373 (2001), where U.N. Sec. Council confirms resolution 1368 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
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For Saddam Hussein to successfully argue that any actions undertaken against the town
of Al-Dujail and its citizens in response to the assassination attempt are no different than those
taken by the United States in Afghanistan after 9/11, he must satisfy the customary international
law requirements for the doctrine of self-defense. The defense counsel must prove that the
assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein rises to the level of an “armed attack” as required
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 80 Failing to prove that the assault on Saddam Hussein and
his motorcade is an “armed attack” as interpreted by international standards, will nullify any
further arguments by defense counsel that Saddam’s actions are justified as a lawful exercise of
self-defense. Subsection D of the Legal Analysis section will address why Saddam Hussein will
probably not satisfy Article 51’s requirement of “armed attack.”
Even if Saddam Hussein can prove that an “armed attack” did in fact occur, self-defense
only validates measures that “are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to
it.” 81 To satisfy the requirement of necessity, defense counsel must prove that the need for
actions in response to the assassination attempt by Saddam Hussein or his subordinates must
have been “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation.” 82

Saddam must also show that there was no peaceful alternative and the

subsequent arrests, summary executions, razing of the palm groves, tortures and other actions
taken were necessary given the nature and severity of the “armed attack.” Even if Saddam can
successfully show that his response was necessary, he must also prove that the defensive
measures were proportionate to the seriousness and scope of the attack. Subsection E of the
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Legal Analysis section will address why Saddam Hussein will probably not satisfy the necessity
and proportionality requirements under customary international law.
The final three subsections, F, G, & H, address other legal issues of importance that are
not directly related to the defense of self-defense. Subsection F of the Legal Analysis Section
will demonstrate why Saddam’s retaliatory acts against the citizens of Al-Dujail will be deemed
a reprisal or act of revenge and prohibited under international law. Saddam Hussein is also
likely to argue that the any actions taken against the citizens of Al-Dujail were acceptable
because he was unable to distinguish terrorists or insurgents from innocent civilians. Subsection
G of the Legal Analysis section will address why this argument is flawed and will ultimately
prove unsuccessful. Finally, Subsection H of the Legal Analysis Section will show that Saddam
Hussein will not be successful if he attempts to avoid liability under the tu quoque defense.

B. Self-Defense is an Inherent Right and Valid Defense to “Armed Attacks” Under
Codified and Customary International Law.
1. Foundation for Self-Defense in Customary International Law—Caroline
Doctrine. 83
The right of self-defense as recognized by modern customary international law has its
foundation in the Caroline doctrine which establishes the essential prerequisites to exercising
this valuable right. In 1837, an insurrection arose in Canada against the British crown. Many
Americans were sympathetic to the Canadian insurgents and provided them with assistance. In
late December, approximately 70 or 80 armed British soldiers boarded the Caroline, an
American steamship docked in Schlosser, New York, and attacked the crew. After the attack,
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the British set the Caroline on fire, cut the ship loose from its moorings, and sent it over the
Niagara Falls.
Upon learning of the incident, Secretary of State Forsyth addressed a letter to Mr. Fox,
the British minister at Washington, and demanded that redress and reparation be made for the
destruction of property and the assassination of United States citizens on American soil. Mr. Fox
claimed that the destruction of the Caroline was an act of necessary self-defense because the
Caroline was engaged in carrying supplies and military stores from the American side of the
river to the rebels in Navy Island (part of British territory). Since the American authorities had
difficulty enforcing the laws of the United States along the frontier border, the British felt they
had a clear right to seize and destroy the Caroline.
The case was finally resolved five years later through a series of letters between Secretary
of State Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton of Great Britain.

Though neither country

ultimately agreed on whether the attack on the Caroline was necessary under the circumstances,
both agreed that there are situations where self-defense may be necessary. In a letter to Lord
Ashburton, Secretary of State Webster stated that the permissibility of self-defense “should be
confined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” 84 In this letter, Secretary Webster
set forth the conditions of necessity and proportionality which came to be accepted as the
customary legal requirements for the exercise of self-defense (the “Caroline doctrine”). 85
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2. United Nations Supports Self-Defense in Article 51 of U.N. Charter.
At the end of World War II, the United Nations was established to create an international
peace and security order that would restrain the exercise of force and save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war. 86

The United Nations Charter (the “U.N. Charter”)

includes two key articles embodying the international community’s resolution to prohibit the use
of force by member nations. First, Article 2(3) requires that all members settle their disputes by
peaceful means so that international peace and security are not endangered. 87

The second key

charter provision, Article 2(4), is considered the core international legal rule relating to a state’s
right to resort to armed force. Article 2(4) requires all members to “refrain in their international
relations from the use of force that would threaten the territorial integrity, or political
independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.” 88 By including the phrase, “purposes of the United Nations,” Article 2(4) could also
be interpreted to preclude the use of armed force that would interfere with peace, security, equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, human rights and fundamental freedoms. 89 Collectively
these provisions prohibit any state from using force against another nation that would endanger
international peace and security. 90
Though the primary goal of the United Nations is to promote international peace and
security, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (“Article 51”) provides a self-defense exception to the
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prohibition of the use of force by one nation against another. Article 51 states that “nothing in
the Charter may impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” 91 This “inherent right” of
individual or collective self-defense is a right existing independent of the Charter and not subject
to an express grant. 92 Self-defense is a full justification for actions taken by an aggressor and not
just an excuse. 93 The U.N. Charter therefore codifies the long-established “inherent right” under
customary international law of any nation to defend itself against armed attack.

3. The Statute of the International Criminal Court Provides Grounds for Excluding
Criminal Responsibility.
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was established in 2002 as a permanent
tribunal to assure that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole do not go unpunished. 94 To that end, the ICC is vested with jurisdiction to decide cases
involving the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression, 95 which are generally considered to be the most heinous of all international crimes.
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The ICC was created as a permanent tribunal so that an ad hoc tribunal would not have to be
created every time these crimes occurred. 96
Notwithstanding the ICC’s authority to adjudicate these kinds of cases, the ICC
recognizes that self-defense may be grounds for excluding criminal responsibility for certain
criminal acts. Article 31 of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides that a defendant will not be
held criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s conduct: the person acts reasonably to
defend himself or another person, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or other person protected. 97 This defense has
been taken from national criminal law and has some limitations to its application. 98 In the case
of genocide or crimes against humanity, for example, the practical application of the customary
international law requirements of necessity and proportionality, will rarely justify self-defense as
a lawful response. 99 Some have even argued that self-defense under Article 31 is primarily
limited to war crimes when the defense is invoked as a defensive reaction against unjust
attacks. 100 Though self-defense is recognized by the ICC as a valid defense under its statute, it
will probably not be successful as a defense against genocide or crimes against humanity.
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C. International Law Supports the Use of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors.
Customary international law does not restrict the application of self-defense only to
conflicts that arise between two separate nations or states. A state or government may also
defend itself against an “armed attack” by insurgents or terrorists who are non-state actors. The
first example in recent history where this was witnessed was during the Caroline incident. There
the British attacked an American ship and its crew which were assisting Canadian insurgents that
opposed the crown. 101 The United States and Great Britain agreed that such an attack was
permissible so long as it was “necessary.” 102 Since that time, it has generally been seen as
acceptable under customary international law for a nation to defend itself against a non-state
actor so long as the appropriate steps have been taken.
Exercising the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is not restricted
to situations where the initial hostile attack was committed by a foreign state or nation. When
the inherent right of self-defense was codified in Article 51, the drafters had the opportunity to
limit its lawful use to armed conflicts between state actors. Article 51, however, is silent on the
issue and does not contain any language limiting self-defense to situations where the “armed
attack” is committed by a foreign nation. 103 Furthermore, the language found in Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter which prohibits the use of force by one “Member” against “any state” is not
repeated in Article 51. 104 Although there is widespread agreement that an “armed attack” must
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occur, nothing in the language of Article 51 requires that such an armed attack be carried out by
another state, nation, or belligerent, as opposed to armed attacks by various other non-state
actors. 105 There should be no distinction in whether a state can defend itself against attacks from
across territorial boundaries but not against armed attacks or conflicts that originate from
within. 106 Since Article 51 is silent as to the required source of the armed attack, a nation can
arguably invoke its right to defend itself against a state or non-state perpetrator, an insurgent or
even against a terrorist.

D. Requirements For the Lawful Exercise of Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.
The United Nations has encapsulated two essential requirements under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter that are requisite for a valid use of self-defense. The harmed state must: (1) be the
victim of an “armed attack” that has occurred; and (2) notify the Security Council of any exercise
of self-defense. Article 51 states that “nothing in the Charter may impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations,” and that any “[m]easures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.” 107
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1. Armed Attack on State.
For Saddam Hussein to properly defend his actions in Al-Dujail as a lawful exercise of
self-defense, he must first prove that the assassination attempt rises to the level of an “armed
attack” under customary international law. The phrase “armed attack” is a legal term that does
not include all attacks, border disputes, or assaults against a nation or government. Whether an
attack is deemed an “armed attack” under international law is determined by holdings from the
international courts, Security Council resolutions, and the international community’s reaction
when a state exercises its inherent right of self-defense. For Saddam Hussein to be successful
under the doctrine of self-defense, he must show that the assassination attempt is deemed an
“armed attack” as defined in customary international law.

a. The Assassination Attempt May Not Meet the Threshold Level of
Intensity to be Considered an “Armed Attack.”
For the attack on Saddam Hussein and his motorcade to be considered an “armed attack”
that justifies defensive action, the force used by the attackers must reach a certain threshold of
intensity. 108 Under international law, not all attacks on a government or nation will validate the
lawful exercise of self-defense. The ICJ in Nicaragua v. U.S. stated that it is necessary to
distinguish “the gravest forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other
less grave forms.” 109 The determination of “intensity” is evaluated on a “case by case basis of
whether an armed attack has occurred, whether it has reached the necessary threshold of
intensity, and thus whether the counterforce is a legal use of self-defense.” 110
108

Wolfrum, supra note 11, at 1166 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

109

Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101, para. 191, (I.C.J. 1986) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 20].

110

Wolfrum, supra note 11, at 1166 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

30

i. The Terrorist Attacks of 9/11 Meet the Requisite Threshold Level of
Intensity Needed for Classification as an “Armed Attack,” but the
Attack on Saddam Hussein Might not Qualify as such Under
International Law.
For defense counsel to successfully argue that Saddam Hussein’s actions in Al-Dujail are
no different from those taken by the United States after 9/11, it must first prove that like the
terrorist attacks on 9/11, the assassination attempt rises to the level of an “armed attack”
justifying the lawful exercise of self-defense. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the assassination
attempt on Saddam Hussein are not analogous. The catalyst that triggered the United States’
valid exercise of its inherent right of self-defense against Al-Qaeda terrorists was categorically
dissimilar to the assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein. The scale of the 9/11 attack was akin
to that of a military assault. An attack on American soil of this magnitude had not occurred since
the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1942 and the 9/11 attack was even more
dramatic with death tolls eventually reaching almost 3,000 persons from 81 different
countries. 111 To find U.S. deaths on the same scale in a single day requires going back to the
U.S. Civil War. 112 The attacks also destroyed four civilian aircraft, the World Trade Center
towers and a section of the Pentagon. 113 Furthermore, the complete destruction of the famous
twin towers in the heart of the United States’ largest city was a severe blow to the American
financial center and economy. These and other factors led to the Security Council unanimously
recognizing the United States’ inherent right to exercise its individual or collective self-defense
in accordance with the U.N. Charter. 114
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Although the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were deemed by the Security Council and
international community to be an “armed attack” under customary international law, the
assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein is not of the same magnitude and may not meet
the required threshold level of intensity. Admittedly, any assassination attempt or attack on the
President of a nation is serious. However, in the assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein,
thousands of people did not lose their lives and the Iraqi economy did not suffer severe damage
as a result. Though several governmental vehicles were riddled with bullets and some of
Saddam Hussein’s bodyguards lost their lives while protecting the Iraqi President, 115 it is
questionable whether these actions alone would be considered an “armed attack” under
international standards. The 9/11 attack was one of the few examples in modern history where
the United Nations and the international community approved the use of armed force in the
exercise of self-defense. 116 The assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein simply does not
equate to the severity and massive scale of the 9/11 attack and therefore may not be considered
an “armed attack” under customary international law.

ii. Saddam Will Probably not be Able to Aggregate Past Terrorist
Attacks Against the Iraqi Government to Reach the Threshold Level
of Intensity Required Under International Law for a Finding of an
Armed Attack.
In the alternative, Saddam Hussein could argue that if all of Al-Dawa’s previous terrorist
attacks on the Iraqi government are accumulated (including the assassination attempt in AlDujail), the combined attacks would meet the threshold level of intensity. The “accumulation of
events theory” was first proposed in 1985 after Israel bombed a Palestinian Liberation
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Organization camp in Tunisia. Israel justified its action as legitimate self-defense against prior
acts of terrorism, allegedly committed by the PLO, which had caused seventy-five Israeli civilian
deaths during the preceding months. 117 Israel’s argument was that repeated and unpredictable
terrorist attacks were sufficient to establish a self-defense claim under Article 51. 118 The United
Nations Security Council rejected this theory and voted 14 to 0 (with the United States
abstaining) to condemn Israel for its attack on Tunisia.119 The Security Council refused to look
beyond the immediate situation or consider Israel's "accumulation of events" theory for
justification. The Israeli position on self-defense was simply too open-ended and subjective for
the international community to tolerate. 120

Similarly, any previous attacks on the Iraqi

government by Al-Dawa occurred several years before the assassination attempt and would be
too speculative to aggregate. It is therefore not likely that Saddam Hussein will be successful in
arguing the “accumulation of events” theory.

b. An Attack May be Deemed an Armed Attack if Performed by a “Regular Armed
Force.”
i. The Assassination Attempt on Saddam Hussein May not be Deemed
an “Armed Attack” under International Law Because the Attackers
Are Probably Not Considered a “Regular Armed Force.”
The assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein may not rise to the level of “armed attack”
required under international law if the attackers are not considered a “regular armed force.” The
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ICJ in Nicaragua v. U.S., relying on the U.N.’s definition of aggression, held that an “armed
attack” occurs when regular armed forces cross an international border, or when a state sends
“armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against
another State.”121 In Nicaragua, the United States argued that the mining of Nicaraguan ports,
attacks on oil installations, and various other attacks it carried out against Nicaragua were
justified because Nicaragua provided arms and other assistance to opposition forces in El
Salvador, which assistance amounted to an “armed attack” under international law.

The

International Court of Justice disagreed, holding that any action taken by the aggressor must
amount to an actual attack by regular forces.122

The attack on Saddam Hussein and his

motorcade may not be considered an “armed attack” under international law because the
seventeen disgruntled citizens responsible for the assassination attempt could hardly be classified
as a regular force in the traditional sense. The facts do not indicate that the attack was performed
by an army, soldiers, or fighters trained in the art of war. Rather than use rocket propelled
grenades or bombs to carry out the attack, the assailants only fired upon Saddam Hussein with
Kalashnikov rifles and were quickly overpowered by Saddam’s bodyguards and soldiers. 123 The
attack is better viewed as a conventional crime or use of force and not as an armed attack under
international law.
As a counter-defense, Saddam Hussein could possibly argue that even though his
attackers were not a regular force in the conventional sense, they used weapons traditionally used
by regular military personnel and therefore should be likened to a regular force. The assailants
121
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were heavily armed with military assault weapons (AK-47s), which are used by many militaries
around the world. Saddam could also argue that those who engaged in the attack were members
of Dawa, the military wing of an Islamic terrorist organization, and had successfully committed
several previous acts of terrorism against the Iraqi government. In rebuttal, the prosecution
could argue that the possession of assault weapons does not automatically justify the finding of a
regular force. For example, gang members in Los Angeles or New York City who possess semiautomatic weapons would probably not be considered a regular force as required by the ICJ, but
only dangerous criminals. Research did not uncover any authority under customary international
law for Saddam’s potential arguments and the IST will probably find that these facts do not
warrant a finding that the attackers are considered a regular force.

ii. Though the Assassination Attempt Against George Bush Sr. Was
Deemed by the International Community to be an “Armed Attack,”
the Attack Against Saddam Hussein is Distinguishable Because it was
Probably Not Committed by an “Armed Regular Force.”
It is likely that defense counsel will equate the attack on Saddam Hussein with the
assassination attempt against former President Bush in 1993, which was generally accepted by
the international community as an armed attack justifying the United States’ lawful use of selfdefense. On April 14, 1993, while President Bush Sr. was beginning a three-day visit to Kuwait
city, Kuwaiti authorities thwarted a terrorist plot, seizing a powerful car bomb and other
explosives and arresting 16 suspects. 124 After careful investigation, the United States obtained
conclusive proof that the attempted assassination was the work of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
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acting under the direction of the Iraqi government. 125 The United States justified the launching of
twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Baghdad as an act of
self-defense because America viewed an assassination attempt against its former Head of State
as an attack against itself.

126

Although there was never a judicial determination, most states

either approved of or did not object to the United States’ decision to bomb Iraqi targets and no
action was ever taken by the U.N. Security Council as a result of the U.S. missile attack.
Although the assassination attempt against former President Bush is analogous to the
attack on Saddam, the prosecution could argue that the two attacks are distinguishable. The
assassination attempt against President Bush was performed by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, a
governmental agency under the control of Iraq, whereas the attack on Saddam Hussein was
committed by Iraqi civilians with no formal ties to any government. Relying on the ICJ’s
holding in Nicaragua, the prosecution would argue that an “armed attack” against the U.S.
occurred in 1993 because Iraq sent “armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries [to] carry out
acts of armed force against [the United States].”127 The attempt on former President Bush’s life
was executed by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, an Iraqi government agency generally known to
be equivalent to the CIA in the United States, which could be considered a regular force. In
order to carry out the attack, highly specialized military training was needed to position and
detonate the powerful car bomb and other explosives which would have taken many lives and
caused much bloodshed. Those responsible for the attack on Saddam Hussein, however, cannot
be included in the same category of “regular forces.” Saddam’s attackers were Iraqi civilians
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with seemingly no specialized technical training and were more akin to common thugs or gang
members with assault rifles. They were not members of any state intelligence unit or other
governmental agency and were not sent by any hostile foreign government. They also would not
have killed hundreds of people had they been successful. In rebuttal to these arguments, defense
counsel could use the United State’s position before the Security Council in 1993 128 and argue
that any attack on a President is the same as an attack on the nation and serious enough to
warrant defensive action. This argument, however, does not negate the fact that the attackers in
each assassination attempt are different. It is not likely that defense counsel will be successful
under this argument because Saddam Hussein’s attackers will probably not be deemed an armed
regular force as required by the ICJ.

c. Saddam Hussein has not Provided Conclusive Evidence Linking the Citizens of
Al-Dujail to the Attack.
Even if the attack on Saddam Hussein by the seventeen assailants constitutes an “armed
attack” under international law, Saddam Hussein has not provided conclusive evidence
demonstrating that the citizens of Al-Dujail were directly responsible for the “armed attack,” and
therefore he was not legally justified in exercising the right of self-defense. It is an accepted rule
in customary international law that any state exercising the right of armed force in self-defense
must prove that the party against whom the counter-attack is launched is to blame for the “armed
attack.” In Iran v. United States, the ICJ held that the United States had the burden of proving
that “attacks had been made upon it for which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were
of such a nature as to be qualified as ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of that expression in
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.” 129 After bombing four Iranian offshore oil production
platforms, the U.S. claimed that it had acted in self-defense because Iran had launched a missile
that struck a United States flag vessel near Kuwait harbor and Iran had also placed mines in
international waters, one of which the warship USS Samuel B. Roberts struck. Since the United
States could not provide conclusive evidence that Iran had launched the missile, or direct
evidence that Iran was responsible for placing the mines in international waters, the ICJ held that
the evidence was too attenuated and inconclusive to justify the United States’ claim of selfdefense. 130 Similarly, Saddam must provide conclusive evidence demonstrating that the citizens
of Al-Dujail were responsible in some way for the assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein.
The facts only demonstrate that seventeen unidentified gunmen committed the armed attack
against Saddam Hussein and not the thousands of Al-Dujail citizens that Saddam Hussein
retaliated against. Unless Saddam Hussein can provide conclusive evidence that the individuals
he summarily executed, arrested, tortured and hung were also responsible for the attack, his
actions against the town of Al-Dujail will be considered a violation of international law.

d. Providing Logistical Support, Shelter, Weapons, or other Support is Insufficient
for Finding of “Armed Attack” under International Law.
Assuming arguendo that the citizens of Al-Dujail are considered conspirators or
accomplices in the attack on Saddam, 131 because they provided some form of logistical support,
shelter, food, or weapons to the attackers, these actions would still not constitute an “armed
129
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attack” justifying the counter-defensive measures undertaken by Saddam Hussein. The ICJ in
Nicaragua held that the concept of “armed attack” does not include providing assistance to
rebels in the form of weapons, logistical or other support. 132 This is because providing support
to rebels does not amount to an attack by regular forces. Such assistance may be regarded as a
threat or use of force, 133 but does not rise to the threshold level of intensity required for an
“armed attack” under international law. Any logistical support, shelter, food, or even weapons
that the citizens of Al-Dujail may have provided to the attackers are equivalent to criminal acts at
most and do not rise to the level of “armed attack” that justifies defensive actions under
international law.

2. Nations Exercising Lawful Right of Self-Defense Must Notify the U.N. Security
Council.
After a Member nation or state exercises its inherent right of self-defense, Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter requires that state to report its actions to the Security Council. It is generally
known that the purpose of requiring the reporting of any armed force used against a previous
aggressor is to give the Security Council the opportunity to assess the situation and prevent the
conflict from escalating beyond the practical achievement of peaceful means. “This requirement,
though explicit and unambiguous, has rarely been observed by States using force.” 134 Though
the Security Council has passed judgment on states that failed to notify it of their employment of
self-defense, 135 research did not uncover any circumstances where the Security Council
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sanctioned any Member for failing to report the exercise of the State’s inherent right of selfdefense. Thus, although Article 51 requires Member states to report to the Security Council any
actions of armed force used against other nations, no Member nation has faced sanctions for
failing to do so.

E. Customary International Law Requirements of “Necessity” and “Proportionality” are
Probably Not Met.
Even if defense counsel is able to prove that the assassination attempt is deemed an
illegal “armed attack” under international law, it must also prove that Saddam Hussein’s
response against the town of Al-Dujail was necessary under the circumstances and proportionate
to the original attack. The ICJ in Nicaragua held that it is a well established rule of customary
international law that even when a state is lawfully engaged in the exercise of its inherent right of
self-defense, its use of force must be limited to that force necessary to defend against the attack
and must be proportionate. 136

It is not likely that Saddam Hussein will be successful in

establishing either of these prerequisites to the lawful use of armed force against aggressors.
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1. The Lawful Exercise of Self-Defense Must be Deemed “Necessary” under the
Circumstances.
Defense counsel must prove that Saddam Hussein’s armed retaliation 137 was a necessary
exercise of self-defense, because there was no other meaningful alternative. Necessity as a
requirement of self-defense in international law has its roots in the Caroline doctrine, where
American Secretary of State Daniel Webster stated that self-defense “should be confined to cases
in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.” 138 The principle of necessity requires a harmed nation
to explore potential peaceful resolutions to a threat before relying on the use of military force 139
and asks the question of whether peaceful means would be sufficient to forestall the danger of
future attacks and provide adequate redress.140 If peaceful alternatives were available to Saddam
Hussein to redress the harms Iraq incurred from the attack, his response will be considered
unnecessary and a violation of customary international law.

a. The Assault on Al-Dujail was Not Necessary Since Saddam Hussein Had
Alternative Means at his Disposal to Handle the Attackers.
Saddam Hussein’s reprisal against the town of Al-Dujail will probably not satisfy the
requirement of necessity because he had alternative means at his disposal to bring those
responsible for the attack to justice. In Prosecutor v. Stakic, the ICTY held that coordinated and
137
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sustained armed attacks on civilian settlements in retaliation for an attack on Serbian soldiers by
Muslim extremists was not lawful under international law, since alternative measures were
available. 141 In that case, Serbian forces responded to an attack by Muslim extremists on a
Serbian military patrol by launching a full-fledged military maneuver against the citizens of
Jakupovici. 142 The ICTY agreed that the Serbs had a lawful right to self-defense but reasoned
that other courses of action were at the Serbian forces’ disposal to find the attackers, such as
dispatching units to search for the alleged perpetrators.143 Similarly, Saddam had the lawful
right to bring the perpetrators to justice for the attack. The attackers in Al-Dujail were Iraqi
citizens and could have easily been arrested and tried as common criminals. But rather than
simply arrest those responsible and grant them the due process of the law, Saddam’s secret police
abducted approximately 1,500 men, women and children and subjected them to torture, beatings
and other atrocities over the course of four years. He also chose to punish the attackers’
community by destroying 240,000 acres of fruit groves and orchards. Saddam’s need to take
such actions can hardly be considered instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of other
means.

b. Unlike the United States’ Response after 9/11, Saddam Hussein’s Actions Against
Al-Dujail Will Probably Not be Deemed Necessary Under International Law.
For defense counsel to successfully argue that Saddam Hussein’s actions in Al-Dujail
were no different from those taken by the United States after 9/11, it must show that his actions
were necessary because he had no other reasonable alternative in response to the attack. After
141
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9/11, the United States argued that it had no alternative but to launch an attack on Afghanistan
because the Taliban harbored Al-Qaeda terrorists and refused to hand them over to the proper
authorities. The United States had previously attempted to negotiate with Afghanistan leaders
but the Taliban refused to cooperate. 144 The United States subsequently launched a powerful
barrage of cruise missiles and long-range bombers against terrorist training camps of Osama bin
Laden’s Al-Qaeda network. 145 President Bush announced that the targets chosen were necessary
and designed to disrupt use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the
military capability of bin Laden’s organization. 146 Even assuming that the citizens of Al-Dujail
are considered terrorists, Saddam Hussein did not find himself in the same position as the United
States. Iraq was the harboring state and could deal with Iraqi terrorists as it would any other
criminal. Since the attackers were Iraqi citizens, the only necessary action was for Saddam to
arrest the assailants and try them as common criminals.

Absent further provocation, any

additional actions by Saddam Hussein were simply not necessary.

2. Any Defensive Actions taken Must be “Proportionate” to the Initial “Armed
Attack.”
Assuming arguendo that the assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein rises to the level
of an “armed attack” and Saddam Hussein’s retaliation against Al-Dujail and its citizens is
deemed necessary by international standards, the hostile actions taken by Saddam Hussein will
probably not satisfy the additional requirement of proportionality.

Under customary

international law, any defensive measures undertaken by an attacked nation or state must be
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“proportionate” to the seriousness and scope of the attack. 147 Even though Article 51 does not
specifically require that an armed response be proportional or necessary, “it does not subsume
[nor] supervene customary international law.” 148 The ICJ in Nicaragua held that it is a well
established rule of customary international law that even when a sate is lawfully engaged in the
exercise of its inherent right of self-defense, its use of force must be proportionate. 149 When
defensive action is greatly excessive to the provocation, as measured by relative casualties or
scale of weaponry, the international courts and international opinion will more readily condemn
such defense as illegally disproportionate. 150

Proportionality is paramount in judging the

lawfulness of forcible acts. For example, some have argued that the destruction of a village
because of a single terrorist incident would be grossly disproportionate and creates revulsion and
horror. 151 Proportionality is especially relevant to actions that injure noncombatants or destroy
civilian property to an excessive degree.

Actions of self-defense by armed forces against

terrorists are not exempt from basic humanitarian rules applicable to armed conflict. 152 Many
have also argued that self-defense can never justify genocide or crimes against humanity because
of the lack of proportionality or the imbalance between the interests protected, 153 and because
less radical means are almost always available.
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a. Saddam Hussein’s Retaliation Against the People of Al-Dujail will
Probably Not Satisfy the Requirement of Proportionality.
Saddam Hussein’s retaliation against the people of Al-Dujail will probably not satisfy the
requirement of proportionality because his response was not proportional to the scope of the
assassination attempt. In Prosecutor v. Stakic, the ICTY held that coordinated and sustained
armed attacks on civilian settlements by Serbian forces in retaliation for a prior attack by Muslim
extremists on a Serbian convoy was not considered a proportional response under international
law. 154

The ICTY recognized the Serbs’ right of self-defense but reasoned that such a

justification was absurd in light of the eyewitness testimony that the attack was a planned and
coordinated military operation of extreme intensity with infantry and armored vehicles opening
fire not only on the houses in the village but also on the unarmed civilians fleeing into the nearby
forests. 155 Admittedly, Saddam’s armies did not launch a full blown military assault on AlDujail. In the aftermath of the attack, however, multiple rounds of heavy artillery were fired at
crowds of civilians that had come to greet Saddam. Saddam’s armies also committed many
atrocities against the citizens of Al-Dujail. Iraqi special police murdered approximately fifteen
unarmed men subsequent to the attack on Saddam without granting them any opportunity for a
fair trial. There is no evidence that these unarmed men resisted arrest but they were summarily
executed nonetheless. Rather then simply arrest those responsible and bring them to justice,
Saddam’s henchmen kidnapped approximately 1,500 men women and children and subjected
them to torture, beatings and other atrocities for several years. Of those arrested, 143 were tried
in show trials and publicly executed by hanging. Saddam also chose to punish the citizens of Al-
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Dujail by destroying 240,000 acres of fruit groves and orchards. His actions can hardly be
considered proportional to the assassination attempt which only resulted in the death of a few of
his body guards; his response must therefore be considered unlawful.

b. Even if Citizens are Classified as Terrorists, Saddam Hussein’s Actions
were Still Not Proportional to the Original Attack.
Saddam Hussein will probably argue that due to the unconventional means used by
terrorists and insurgents to commit their attacks, he was unable to respond to the terrorists’
actions using traditional methods of law enforcement and therefore proportionality is an
inappropriate standard to evaluate his actions.

In conventional warfare, proportionality is

defined along the lines of fighting an adversary with similar weapons systems. 156 For example,
fighting tanks with tanks and supporting artillery would be proportionally adequate whereas
fighting tanks with nuclear warheads would clearly be disproportionate. 157 Some have argued
that proportionality does not work when engaging in defensive actions against terrorists because
states will not fight terrorists with explosive-filled trucks or suicide bombers. 158 Nonetheless, if
some restraint is not exercised in responding to terrorist attacks, the doctrine of proportionality
could become a nullity. An aggressor would only have to argue that the attackers were terrorists
and therefore excessive use of force is acceptable under international law.

Customary

international law has never distinguished between different sources of the attack and it is
irrelevant whether the attack is performed by terrorists or a regular army. For an armed attack to
be considered lawful by international standards it must be proportionate to the original attack.
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F. Reprisal and Acts of Revenge Against Civilians Are Prohibited under International
Law.
State acts of reprisal or revenge that are directed against civilians are abhorred by the
international community and considered unlawful under customary international law. In keeping
with the purposes of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. General Assembly has resolved that reprisals are
unlawful and nations have a duty to refrain from them. 159 Reprisals against civilians and civilian
targets are especially egregious and constitute a grave breach of international humanitarian law.
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions states that, “attacks against the civilian population or
civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.” 160 If the response undertaken by Saddam Hussein
against the people of Al-Dujail is considered a reprisal or act of revenge, it will be declared
unlawful under international law.
While self-defense is recognized as a lawful justification for the use of force in customary
international law, Saddam Hussein’s retaliatory acts against the town of Al-Dujail and its citizens
will probably be deemed a reprisal or act of revenge.

Self-defense is justified in some

circumstances because it is implemented to protect the security and essential rights of a state and
its citizens. When self-defense is used as an act of punishment or revenge, however, it is
considered an armed reprisal and unlawful under international law. 161 Reprisals are generally
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punitive and differentiated from self-defense by time, necessity and motivation. 162

A clearly

excessive amount of counterforce can be interpreted as a blatant reprisal disguised as selfdefense. The prosecution could successfully argue that Saddam’s attack on the village of AlDujail was a reprisal or act of vengeance. Rather than simply arrest the perpetrators, Saddam
decided to punish the citizens of Al-Dujail by razing the palm groves and destroying many
homes and businesses. Many villagers were also transported to Saddam’s gulags and beaten or
tortured. These actions were undertaken to drive fear into the hearts of the citizens of Al-Dujail
and to compel strict obedience to the former dictator. Saddam’s actions were clearly meant to be
punishment for the attempted assassination. Simply claiming that a retaliatory act is an act of
self-defense should be insufficient to disguise what was really an unlawful reprisal.

G. Inability to Distinguish Terrorists or Insurgents from Innocent Civilians Is Not
Sufficient to Justify Retaliatory Acts as Self-Defense.
Saddam will likely argue that it was impossible to differentiate the terrorists and
insurgents from innocent civilians and any civilians killed or harmed while trying to quell an
insurrection were just “collateral damage.” This argument, which is partially based on current
U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to “uproot” terrorists and suppress the insurgency, will
probably not be successful. Under Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, parties to an armed
conflict are required to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and may
direct their operations only against military objectives. 163 Whenever it is uncertain whether a
person is a civilian or a combatant, that person is considered to be a civilian under international
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law. 164 Since Saddam was uncertain of whether the citizens of Al-Dujail were armed terrorists or
law abiding citizens, he was required under international law to operate under the assumption
that they were civilians. The ICTY has held that “any deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian
objects are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law.” 165 Notwithstanding that
Saddam was unable to distinguish the Dawa terrorists from civilians, it was unlawful to launch
an attack against the citizens of Al-Dujail because of their civilian status. The rationale for such
strict adherence to these principles is to protect the civilian population from unlawful armed
attacks and the atrocities of war. Courts have recognized the difficulty during unconventional
warfare to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, but have refused to mitigate criminal
responsibility for actions against innocent civilians. 166
Though it may be difficult to differentiate between belligerents and innocent civilians, it
is contrary to the laws of war to kill civilians unless they are armed and jeopardizing the safety of
troops. 167 The United States Army Court of Military Review in U.S. v. Calley held that reprisal
by summary execution of innocent civilians is forbidden in the laws of land warfare
notwithstanding the difficulty in distinguishing enemy belligerents from innocent civilians. 168 In
Calley, the defendant and his troops stormed a village that was allegedly controlled by Viet Cong
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but encountered only unarmed, unresisting, frightened old men, women, and children. 169 The
defendant and some of his men summarily executed over one hundred unarmed villagers. 170 The
defendant justified his actions on the grounds that his superiors had ordered the attack and it was
impossible to distinguish Viet Cong insurgents from innocent civilians. 171 The Military Court
did not agree, holding that reprisal by summary execution of the helpless is forbidden in the laws
of land warfare. 172 Similarly, the Iraqi secret police and other military units summarily executed
fifteen Al-Dujail citizens in the aftermath of the assassination attempt. No evidence indicates
that these individuals were armed or resisted in any manner justifying the lawful exercise of selfdefense. It was unlawful and murderous for Saddam Hussein to kill civilians unless they were
armed and jeopardizing the safety of his troops.
Even if Saddam Hussein is correct in contending that the citizens of Al-Dujail were
insurgents and terrorists and not innocent civilians, the summary execution of terrorists,
insurgents, soldiers or other hostile forces is unlawful under international law. Defense counsel
in Calley argued that since villager sympathy and support for the Viet Cong was so extensive and
enduring, the villagers should not be considered innocent civilians but belligerents 173 themselves.
Though the court did not address the issue of whether the villagers were in fact classified as
belligerents or civilians, it held that summary execution of belligerents is unlawful and against
169
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the Geneva conventions regardless of whether the armed conflict is a local uprising or an
international war. 174 A classification of whether the citizens of Al-Dujail were in fact terrorists
or insurgents is thus unnecessary and irrelevant. Saddam Hussein can not be justified in the
summary executions that occurred simply by the possibility that those killed were terrorists or
insurgents.

H. Saddam Hussein Will Not Successfully Avoid Liability for His Crimes under Tu
Quoque Defense.
It is likely that Saddam Hussein will argue that the atrocities that he committed in AlDujail are defensible because the United States has committed similar acts while combating
terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan. This justification is known as the “tu quoque defense,” which
literally means “you too.” Even if the assumption holds true that the U.S. has committed similar
atrocities in its efforts to eliminate terrorists, the international courts have universally rejected the
tu quoque defense. In Hadzihasanovic, the ICTY stated that “the Tribunal's jurisprudence is
quite clear that the principles of tu quoque [do] not constitute a defense and has no basis in the
law.” 175 In Simic, the defense attempted to justify the commission of crimes against humanity
and war crimes because opposition forces had committed similar crimes.

The ICTY

emphatically rejected this argument stating that simply because “there may have been war crimes
or crimes against humanity perpetrated against the Serbs by Croats and Muslims does not justify
the commission of similar crimes by Serbs.” 176 In Kupreskic, the ICTY held that the tu quoque
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defense has no place in contemporary international humanitarian law. 177 An accused does not
exculpate himself from a crime by showing that another has committed a similar crime, either
before or after the commission of the crime by the accused. 178 These holdings are based on the
universal belief that every individual has the duty and obligation to adhere to international law
regardless of the conduct of enemy combatants. Thus, it is irrelevant to Saddam’s case whether
the United States has engaged in unlawful or criminal acts while fighting terrorists. Saddam’s tu
quoque defense will not pass judicial muster and he will be held accountable for any criminal
actions that he has committed.
Even if the tu quoque defense were considered valid under international law, it would
still not exculpate Saddam Hussein from liability because the citizens of Al-Dujail did not
commit similar crimes against Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi government.

Tue quoque is

generally argued to justify unlawful acts against an enemy that has committed similar acts
against the individual accused. 179 The citizens of Al-Dujail are not guilty of or even accused of
committing crimes against humanity against Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi government. Defense
counsel has also not attempted to make this contention. Saddam will instead attempt to justify
his actions because he alleges that the United States has undertaken similar actions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. However, this is not a valid comparison under the tu quoque defense
because any unlawful actions committed by the United States while fighting the insurgency or
terrorists are unrelated to the parties involved in this case and therefore irrelevant. Even if the tu
quoque defense were valid, Saddam would probably not be successful under this argument.
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V. CONCLUSION.
Though self-defense is a valid defense under customary international law that justifies a
state’s use of armed force against terrorist or insurgents, it will probably provide little protection
to Saddam Hussein for the atrocities he committed in Al-Dujail. The attack by the Dawa
terrorists may not rise to the level of an “armed attack” required by Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter because it lacks the required intensity, and the assassination attempt was not committed
by a regular armed force. Even if Saddam can show that the attack on his convoy rises to the
level of an “armed attack,” he has not provided conclusive proof that the citizens of Al-Dujail
were responsible for the attack. Providing assistance, logistical support, or even arms to the
attackers would also not be sufficient for finding that an armed attack occurred.
Assuming arguendo that the assassination attempt is deemed an armed attack by
international legal standards, Saddam will probably not be able to meet the customary
international law requirements of “necessity” or “proportionality.” It is not likely that the IST
will find that the massacre in Al-Dujail was necessary, instant or overwhelming as required by
international law. Furthermore, his response will probably not be deemed proportional to the
seriousness and scope of the initial armed attack. Even if Saddam is able to prove any one of the
three requirements of self-defense under codified and customary international law, it is highly
unlikely that he will be able to satisfy all three of them.
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